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Abstract 
 
This paper calculates indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and revealed symmetric 
comparative advantage (RSCA) for 17 British manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and 
1900. The resulting indicators show that the late-Victorian ‘workshop of the world’ was at a marked 
comparative disadvantage in a number of manufacturing industries. The paper then proceeds to identify 
the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages (disadvantages) using a four-
factor Heckscher-Ohlin model that relies upon these indicators. In contrast with previous scholarship, 
the manufacturing comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain were in the relatively labour non-
intensive industries, and this pattern became more pronounced throughout the period. The paper 
concludes with the observation that the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative 
advantages appear closer to those of the United States than had traditionally been thought. 
 
 
Keywords: comparative advantage, Heckscher-Ohlin, manufacturing, Britain, nineteenth century 
 
JEL codes: F11, F14, N63, N73 
 
 
* The author wishes to thank Chris Minns and Joan Rosés for their many helpful comments. Thilo 
Albers kindly offered his thoughts on an earlier draft of this paper. The author has benefitted from 
feedback received at the SOUND Economic History Workshop at Lund University, the Economic 
History Thesis Seminar at the LSE, and the Economic History Society Annual Conference at 
Cambridge. The research culminating in this paper has been funded by an LSE PhD Studentship. All 
errors are the responsibility of the author.   
 
Varian 1 
 
Introduction 
Despite the voluminous literature on British trade during the nineteenth century, there are no 
systematic calculations of Britain’s comparative advantages for any year prior to 1899, which 
were undertaken by Crafts (1989). Until now, economic historians have generally settled for 
the casual understanding that, according to Harley (2014), ‘the industries of the Industrial 
Revolution retained their comparative advantage until the First World War’.1 Indeed, the 
staple industries of textiles and iron continued to dominate the composition of British exports 
through the late-Victorian era.
2
 However, it remains uncertain whether Britain realized 
comparative advantages in the many other industries that characterized its manufacturing 
sector and, increasingly, the manufacturing sectors (and exports) of other industrial countries. 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the existing literature by calculating indicators of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and revealed symmetric comparative advantage 
(RSCA) for 17 British manufacturing industries for the years 1880, 1890, and, 1900.  
These indicators are then extended into the debate over the factor determinants of 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. The RSCA indicators serve as the 
dependent variable in, initially, a three-factor Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of trade. Here, 
the novel finding is that Britain’s comparative advantages were in the relatively labour non-
intensive manufacturing industries during the late-Victorian era. This finding is inconsistent 
with that of Crafts and Thomas (1986), who estimated the factor determinants of just (non-
normalized) British exports for the year 1880.
3
 Even after controlling for human capital using 
a four-factor H-O model, it remains that the comparative advantages of late-Victorian Britain 
were in the relatively labour non-intensive manufacturing industries. 
Why is a factor-based explanation for the manufacturing comparative advantages of 
late-Victorian Britain a particularly deserving item on the agenda of economic history? 
Broadberry (1997) attributed the comparative labour productivity levels of late nineteenth-
century British manufacturing industries partly to relative factor endowments. One of the 
several patterns that emerged was that Britain tended to realize its highest comparative labour 
productivity levels (vis-à-vis the United States and Germany) in those manufacturing 
industries that used intensively Britain’s relatively abundant supply of human capital.4 
Drawing upon a spectacular range of secondary sources, Broadberry explained the relative 
                                                          
1
 Harley, ‘Early start’, p. 6. 
2
 The staple industries of textiles and iron accounted for fully 66% of British manufactured 
exports in 1902-4. Schlote, British overseas trade, p. 74. 
3
 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 637. 
4
 Broadberry, Productivity race, p. 158. 
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performance of various manufacturing industries during the period from 1850-1914. These 
analyses were, nevertheless, constrained by the unavailability of estimates of comparative 
manufacturing labour productivity disaggregated by industry for any year prior to 1907.
5
 The 
unavailability of estimates was due to the deficiency of output data. Here, there emerges an 
opportunity for this paper. The trade statistics of industrial countries contain data sufficient 
for calculating RCA indicators of British manufacturing industries for the period before 1907. 
Of course, comparative advantage is not the same as comparative labour productivity, and 
this paper avoids any conflation of these concepts. Still, measurements of comparative 
advantage can provide some indication of the relative performance of British manufacturing 
industries during the late-Victorian era. Moreover, systematic measurements of comparative 
advantage facilitate the identification of the factor determinants thereof, via the H-O model. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section presents a review of the literature. 
The next section calculates RCA and RSCA indicators. The following section employs the 
RSCA indicators in three-factor and four-factor H-O models of trade, with the aim of 
identifying the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages. The 
final section of this paper offers some concluding remarks.  
 
Literature review 
Under the H-O model of trade, a country exports those commodities which use intensively its 
relatively abundant factors of production.
6
 Thus, relative factor endowments determine the 
comparative advantages of a country.
7
 This model was used by Crafts and Thomas (1986), 
who estimated the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages in 
selected years from 1910-35, by which time there were regular censuses of production from 
which factor intensities could be calculated. The authors employed a three-factor Heckscher-
Ohlin model, with the factors being capital, human capital, and (unskilled) labour. 
Throughout the period from 1910-35, Britain realized comparative advantages in the 
relatively human capital non-intensive and in the relatively labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries, and these comparative advantages were unaffected by capital intensity.
8
 The 
authors then applied the model to late-Victorian Britain, albeit using cruder data from the 
                                                          
5
 For the construction of these estimates, see Broadberry and Fremdling, ‘British and German 
industry’ and Broadberry, ‘British and American manufacturing’.  
6
 Ohlin, International trade. 
7
 The H-O model departs from the earlier Ricardian model, which identifies technological 
differences between countries as the determinant of comparative advantage. Nevertheless, both 
models offer explanations for the occurrence of comparative advantages.  
8
 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 636. 
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Factory inspectorate returns of 1870, and found similar results, except that capital was a 
statistically significant and positive determinant of Britain’s manufacturing comparative 
advantages during this earlier period.
9
 
 Crafts and Thomas used the phrase ‘comparative advantage’ loosely. For the period 
from 1910-35, they estimated the factor determinants of British gross and net exports. For the 
late-Victorian era, they estimated the factor determinants of just British gross exports in the 
year 1880, using factor proportions inferred from 1870 data. The problem here is that the 
value of gross exports alone does not indicate the presence of a comparative advantage. 
Consider silk manufactures and cement. In 1900, the value of British silk exports was more 
than double the value of British cement exports, yet Britain realized a comparative 
disadvantage in the former industry and a comparative advantage in the latter industry.
10
 This 
paper improves upon Crafts and Thomas by normalizing exports for the composition of world 
exports, i.e. by calculating indicators of comparative advantage. 
 Crafts (1989) did, in fact, calculate RCA indicators for British manufacturing 
industries, along with the manufacturing industries of 10 other mostly industrial countries, for 
the years 1899, 1913, 1929, 1937, and 1950. In doing so, he employed the method advanced 
by Balassa (1965), which is discussed fully in the next section of this paper. For the year 
1899, Crafts observed that Britain’s comparative advantages were greatest in the more mature 
industries of shipbuilding, iron, and textiles, rather than in the industries of the Second 
Industrial Revolution, which exhibited greater scope for new technology by the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century.
11
 However, no factor-based explanation for the pattern of 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages was offered. 
 Crafts and Thomas’s portrait of manufacturing in late-Victorian Britain as intensive in 
labour and non-intensive in human capital was the opposite of what Harley (1974) argued 
was true of manufacturing in (slightly later) Edwardian Britain. He argued that Britain was 
relatively abundant in skilled labour and that the United States, given its influx of migrants 
from southern and eastern Europe, was relatively abundant in unskilled labour.
12
 The work of 
Harley is not, however, entirely comparable to the work of Crafts and Thomas. Harley was 
concerned mostly with intra-industry differences between British and American 
manufacturing, specifically within the industries of shipbuilding, textiles, engineering, and 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., p. 637. 
10
 Annual statement (1900). The RCA indicators for these industries are reported in table 1. 
11
 Crafts, ‘Revealed comparative advantage’, p. 130. 
12
 Harley, ‘Edwardian industry’, pp. 394-5. 
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iron and steel. In contrast, Crafts and Thomas were concerned with the pattern of 
specialization among industries. 
 
Measuring comparative advantage 
Balassa (1965) was interested in identifying the comparative advantages of industrial 
countries, not during the late nineteenth century, but rather during the period of trade 
liberalization that followed the Second World War. For Balassa to have determined 
comparative advantages directly would have required an enormous amount of systematically 
collected data on production costs for every industry-country pair. Instead, Balassa 
endeavoured to determine comparative advantages indirectly, based upon the pattern of world 
trade. Assuming that countries actually traded according to their comparative advantages, 
Balassa then argued that the pattern of world trade ‘revealed’ the comparative advantages of 
countries.
13
  
Balassa’s method for calculating an indicator of RCA is expressed as follows: 
RCAc,i =  
Xc,i
Xn,i
Xc
Xn
⁄       (1) 
Here, X refers to the current value of exports, i to the manufactured commodity, c to the 
industrial country, and n to the whole basket of industrial countries. The RCA indicator is 
therefore the country-share of world exports of the manufactured commodity normalized for 
the country-share of world exports of total manufactured commodities. An indicator greater 
than 1 implies a comparative advantage, an indicator less than 1 a comparative disadvantage. 
Specialization according to comparative advantage would, theoretically, cause a country’s 
RCA indicators to cluster around Xn/Xc (‘complete’ comparative advantage) and 0 
(‘complete’ comparative disadvantage).14 However, empirically, indicators fall anywhere 
between these two values, oftentimes quite close to the threshold value. One reason is that the 
manufactured commodity, as defined, encompasses enough heterogeneity such that a country 
may realize a comparative advantage in one variety of the commodity, but a comparative 
disadvantage in another variety of the commodity. This situation is especially likely when the 
RCA indicators are calculated at higher levels of aggregation, such as the industry level, as is 
done by Crafts and by the present author. Another reason is that transport costs and 
preferential tariffs, which distort the pattern of trade, are internalized in the RCA indicator. 
                                                          
13
 Balassa, ‘Trade liberalisation’, p. 103. 
14
 In the case of complete comparative advantage, the indicator of RCA may be less than 
Xn/Xc, if country c completely satisfies world demand. 
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 This last reason was addressed by Costinot et al. (2012), who sought to correct for 
such distortions in identifying comparative advantage. The main specification of their model 
takes the form of a country-pair panel regression, in which the log of pairwise relative 
productivity in an industry predicts the log of bilateral exports in that industry.
15
 An exporter-
importer fixed effect accounts for trade costs, such as transport costs and preferential tariffs, 
among others.
16
 The approach undertaken by Costinot et al. could be employed to identify 
Britain’s comparative advantages, vis-à-vis each of her trading partners, for the late 
nineteenth century, provided bilateral trade data disaggregated by industry actually existed 
for the years 1880, 1890, and 1900, which is not the case. Furthermore, employing the 
approach of Costinot et al. would involve the precarious assumption that the elasticity of 
bilateral exports to pairwise relative productivity was the same in the late nineteenth century 
as in the late twentieth century.  
 This paper therefore settles on Balassa’s method for identifying comparative 
advantages. RCA indicators are calculated for 17 British manufacturing industries for the 
years 1880, 1890, and 1900. The industries—Balassa’s method involved individual 
manufactured commodities—are beer; cement; chemicals; clocks and watches; copper 
manufactures; cotton manufactures; earthenware and chinaware; flax, hemp, and jute 
manufactures; glass; iron, steel, and manufactures thereof; leather and manufactures thereof; 
machinery; paper and manufactures thereof; rubber manufactures; silk manufactures; spirits; 
and woollen and worsted manufactures. These 17 industries differ noticeably from the 16 
industries for which Crafts (1989) calculated RCA indicators. Crafts’ industries were largely 
predetermined in the sense that he relied solely on Tyszynski (1951), rather than on the 
underlying government trade statistics, for data on manufactured exports. Crafts’ industries 
are suitable for the period he considered, which was the early twentieth century. However, 
several of these industries are obviously unsuitable for the late nineteenth century, such as the 
electrical industry and the cars and aircraft industry. The textile industry also presents a 
problem. In 1899, textiles comprised 34 per cent of world manufactured exports and 46 per 
cent of British manufactured exports.
17
 Earlier in the nineteenth century, the share of textiles 
in British manufactured exports was even higher, at 61 per cent in 1882-4.
18
 Concentrating 
half of British manufactured exports and a third of world manufactured exports into a single 
                                                          
15
 Costinot et al., ‘Ricardo’s ideas’, p. 595. 
16
 Ibid., p. 602. 
17
 Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. 
18
 Schlote, British overseas trade, p. 74. 
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industry obscures the actual comparative advantages held by countries, which differed based 
upon the particular class of textile. Therefore, for the purpose of calculating RCA indicators 
for the late nineteenth century, textiles are divided into four classes: cotton manufactures; 
flax, hemp, and jute manufactures; silk manufactures; and woollen and worsted 
manufactures. In general, the 17 industries included in this study mirror the industry 
classifications in the Annual statement of overseas trade, which is the source for data on the 
value of British manufactured exports.  
   Having obtained data on British manufactured exports per industry, the next step in 
calculating the indicators is to gather data on world manufactured exports per industry. This 
latter value is initially approximated by the manufactured exports, per industry, of Britain, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States combined, as recorded in their respective 
trade statistics.
19
 This step is immensely challenging due to the varying classifications of 
industries in the trade statistics of the different countries. Using British and American trade 
statistics, Crafts and Thomas (1986) matched British and American industries, in order to 
compare the factor determinants of British and American exports for a single benchmark 
year. They referred to this process as a ‘problematic and protracted exercise’.20 When the 
trade statistics of five countries are involved, the process of matching industries is 
considerably more problematic and protracted. For example, the British trade statistics keep 
leather and manufactures thereof separate from saddlery and harnesses, whereas the trade 
statistics of other countries do not. Such inconsistencies are, however, generally reconcilable, 
since the finest levels of disaggregation in the trade statistics usually permit the 
‘reconstruction’ of industries. Where inconsistencies are ultimately irreconcilable, such 
inconsistencies are minor and do not materially alter the resulting RCA indicators. In order to 
add together the values of the manufactured exports, per industry, of the five industrial 
countries, these values are converted to sterling using the exchange rates reported in Mitchell 
(1988).
21
    
                                                          
19
 The trade statistics are: Annual statement of the trade of the United Kingdom, Annuaire 
statistique de la Belgique, Tableau du commerce extérieur de la France, Statistisches jahrbuch für 
das Deutsche reich, and Foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. The American data 
are for the years 1879/80, 1889/90, and 1899/1900, the fiscal year having spanned from 1 July to 30 
June.   
20
 Crafts and Thomas, ‘UK manufacturing trade’, p. 632. 
21
 Mitchell, Historical statistics, p. 702. Because the Belgian franc traded at par with the 
French franc during the classical gold standard, Belgian francs are converted to sterling using the 
(French) franc-sterling exchange rate. 
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 The manufactured exports of Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and the United 
States accounted for most, though not all, manufactured exports in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1899, the manufactured exports of these five countries accounted for 87 per cent 
of the manufactured exports of the 11 countries considered by Tyszynski.
22
 A coverage rate 
of 87 per cent would suggest a rescaling factor (γ) of 1.15 for the value of manufactured 
exports, per industry, of the five industrial countries (Xn,i). Balassa’s original method, 
represented in Equation 1, is therefore modified to include a rescaling factor: 
RCAUK,i =  
XUK,i
γXn,i
XUK
Xn
⁄      (2) 
However, a constant rescaling factor for all industries wrongly implies that the industry-
composition of manufactured exports was identical between the basket of five industrial 
countries and the basket of excluded countries. The excluded countries were in an earlier 
stage of industrialization, which was often characterized by light manufacturing, particularly 
textiles.
23
 Consequently, the five industrial countries likely accounted for more than 87 per 
cent of the exports of heavy manufacturing industries and less than 87 per cent of the exports 
of light manufacturing industries. A slightly reduced rescaling factor of 1.1 is applied to the 
heavy manufacturing industries of cement; chemicals; copper manufactures; iron, steel, and 
manufactures thereof; and paper and manufactures thereof. A slightly more generous 
rescaling factor of 1.2 is applied to the remaining industries. Although the rescaling factors of 
1.1 and 1.2 are based upon data from 1899, these rescaling factors are applied to the 
calculations for 1880, 1890, and 1900, since annual data on world manufactured exports pre-
1899 is not available. 
 The next step is to normalize the British share of world manufactured exports per 
industry (XUK,i/γXn,i) by, according to Balassa’s method, the British share of world 
manufactured exports in total (XUK/Xn). Normalizing by the country-share of only secondary-
sector world exports provoked criticism from Vollrath (1991), who argued for the inclusion 
of the primary sector in determining comparative advantage.
24
 Because the British share of 
secondary-sector world exports exceeded the British share of total world exports, the 
exclusion of the primary sector from the normalization factor reduces the levels of the RCA 
                                                          
22
 The 11 countries include the five abovementioned industrial countries, as well as Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, India, and Japan. 
23
 See Hoffman, Industrial economies and Maizels, Industrial growth, pp. 339-40. 
24
 Vollrath, ‘Theoretical evaluation’, p. 269. 
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indicators for British manufacturing industries.
25
 Balassa’s procedure for normalization, 
which was employed by Crafts, risks misidentifying a comparative advantage as a 
comparative disadvantage. Because the objective of this study is not to identify Britain’s 
intra-sector industrial comparative advantages, but rather her multi-sector industrial 
comparative advantages, the normalization factor includes both the primary and secondary 
sectors. Of course, the choice of normalization factor only alters the levels of the indicators, 
not their rank order. Data on the value of total British exports for the years 1880, 1890, and 
1900 come from the Annual statement. Data on total world exports for these years come from 
Lewis (1981).
26
 
 Table 1 presents the resulting RCA indicators for British manufacturing industries, 
with their ranks indicated in parentheses. Given the data assembled, calculating indicators of 
RCA for the manufacturing industries of the other four industrial countries is simple. Since 
these indicators may be of interest to future economic historians, corresponding tables for 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States are supplied in Appendix A. 
 As evident from the table, the RCA indicators for textiles differed greatly depending 
upon the particular class. By 1890, the industry of cotton manufactures held pride of place, 
not just among textiles, but among all British manufacturing industries. The industry of silk 
manufactures, on the other hand, was the only textile industry for which Britain realized a 
consistent comparative disadvantage. Other industries in which the ‘workshop of the world’ 
had a consistent comparative disadvantage were clocks and watches; glass; and leather and 
manufactures thereof. Of the 17 industries, the sharpest movements were in copper 
manufactures (downward) and spirits (upward).
27
 Britain also advanced its comparative 
advantage in woollen and worsted manufactures considerably, even in spite of the heavy 
protection that this industry received in other industrial countries.
28
 
There is a well-defined scholarly debate over the international competitiveness of the 
British engineering (machinery) industry in the late 1890s, when the American engineering  
                                                          
25
 In contrast, the American share of secondary-sector world exports (11%) was less than the 
American share of total world exports (14%) in 1900. Thus, excluding the primary sector from the 
normalization factor increases the levels of the RCA indicators for American manufacturing 
industries. In 1900, the primary sector contributed 68% of American exports. Foreign commerce 
(1900). 
26
 Lewis, ‘World trade’, pp. 54-7. 
27
 For some of the reasons behind these movements, readers are referred to Broadberry, 
Productivity race, pp. 174-5, 196-7. 
28
 See especially Saul, British overseas trade, p. 151. While Britain’s comparative advantage 
in woollen and worsted manufactures would not be affected by foreign protection per se, if such 
protection enabled foreign manufactures to become internationally competitive, as per the infant 
industry argument, then Britain’s comparative advantage would be affected.   
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Table 1. Britain, RCA indicators, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
3.2 
(5) 
3.3 
(3) 
2.9 
(3) 
Cement 
2.7 
(7) 
2.4 
(8) 
1.2 
(12) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
1.6 
(11) 
1.5 
(11) 
1.2 
(11) 
Clocks and watches 
0.5 
(15) 
0.4 
(17) 
0.2 
(17) 
Copper manufactures 
4.3 
(1) 
3.9 
(2) 
1.5 
(10) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
4.3 
(2) 
4.1 
(1) 
4.1 
(1) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.4 
(8) 
2.4 
(7) 
1.8 
(9) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
3.2 
(4) 
3.2 
(5) 
3.1 
(2) 
Glass 
0.9 
(13) 
0.9 
(14) 
0.7 
(15) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
3.6 
(3) 
3.3 
(4) 
2.6 
(4) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.8 
(14) 
0.9 
(15) 
0.9 
(13) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
3.0 
(6) 
2.8 
(6) 
2.2 
(7) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
1.0 
(12) 
1.0 
(13) 
0.8 
(14) 
Rubber manufactures 
2.3 
(9) 
2.3 
(9) 
1.9 
(8) 
Silk manufactures 
0.5 
(16) 
0.5 
(16) 
0.5 
(16) 
Spirits 
0.5 
(17) 
1.2 
(12) 
2.3 
(6) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.9 
(10) 
2.1 
(10) 
2.5 
(5) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Spearman correlation coefficients of Britain’s RCA indicators, 1880-1950 
 1890 1899/1900 1913 1929 1937 
1880 0.95 0.66 -- -- -- 
1890 -- 0.80 -- -- -- 
1899/1900 0.80 -- 0.77 0.41 0.32 
1913 -- 0.77 -- 0.76 0.70 
1929 -- 0.41 0.76 -- 0.89 
1937 -- 0.32 0.70 0.89 -- 
1950 -- 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.75 
Sources: Coefficients for intervals spanning the years 1880, 1890, and 1900 are calculated using data 
from this paper. Coefficients for intervals spanning the years 1899, 1913, 1929, 1937, and 1950 are 
calculated using data from Crafts, ‘Revealed comparative advantage’, p. 130. 
 
industry greatly increased its exports, especially its exports to Britain.
29
 Nicholas (1980) 
argued that the rise in American machine exports to Britain resulted from a strong upswing in 
the British business cycle, which caused domestic demand to exceed domestic supply.
30
 Irwin 
(2003), however, attributed the phenomenon to the increasing international competitiveness 
of American machinery, driven by the declining price of American iron ore.
31
 Although the 
RCA indicator for the British machinery industry was slightly eroded between 1890 and 
1900, the indicator for 1900 hardly suggests a lack of international competitiveness. Though, 
in fairness, the heightened level of American machine exports to Britain abated after 1899. If 
the indicator were calculated for a year between 1896 and 1899, it could be substantially 
lower. 
In order to gauge the relative persistence of Britain’s comparative advantages, 
Spearman correlation coefficients are calculated for various intervals, following the approach 
undertaken by Crafts. Table 2 presents coefficients for the intervals covered in this paper, as 
well as for the intervals covered by Crafts. Different industry classifications prohibit the 
calculation of coefficients for intervals that span the turn of the twentieth century. Persistence 
during the late-Victorian era was roughly on par with persistence during the early twentieth 
century. The correlation coefficient is slightly lower for 1880-1900 than for 1899-1913, but 
this should be expected given the greater length of the former interval. What can be claimed 
with some certainty is that Britain’s comparative advantages underwent a more substantial 
reordering during the 1890s than during the 1880s, when the comparative advantages were 
                                                          
29
 Though, Clapham noted, ‘Long before the ’nineties, exports of new American machinery, 
or of American mechanical notions, had affected the course and pace of industrial change in Britain’ 
in Modern Britain, p. 36. 
30
 Nicholas, ‘Export invasion’, p. 581. 
31
 Irwin, ‘America’s surge’, p. 369. In turn, Irwin attributed the declining price of American 
iron ore to the opening of the Mesabi Range in 1892. 
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remarkably persistent. By the 1890s, the protectionist backlash in Continental Europe had 
been underway for a decade, and the reshuffling of Britain’s comparative advantages in the 
1890s may have been influenced by Continental infant industries having attained 
international competitiveness.     
Before proceeding to the next section, it is necessary to recognize a certain 
fundamental feature of the RCA indicators. With Balassa’s measurement, the range for 
comparative disadvantage is between 0 and 1, while the range for comparative advantage is 
between 1 and the reciprocal of the country-share of world exports, which would be 6.8 for 
Britain in 1900. Such asymmetry is benign when the objective is to ascertain whether or not a 
country had a comparative advantage, or when the objective is to rank the RCA indicators. 
However, as Laursen observed, this asymmetry would tend to violate the assumption in 
regression analysis of normally distributed error terms, and it must therefore be corrected.
32
 
Laursen proposed the following transformation to symmetrize the indicators: 
RSCA =
RCA−1
RCA+1
         (3) 
The next section relies on Laursen’s RSCA indicators, not Balassa’s RCA indicators, when 
estimating the factor determinants of Britain’s comparative advantages. 
 
Factor determinants 
Three-factor model 
This section begins with a three-factor H-O model of Britain’s comparative advantages, with 
the factors being capital, labour, and material inputs. Factor intensities or proxies thereof for 
the 17 British manufacturing industries are calculated from the Census of production of 1907, 
which collected a limited amount of data on British manufacturing activity for the year 1906. 
Conveniently, the data is disaggregated at the industry and sub-industry level, thereby 
permitting the ‘reconstruction’ of industries so that they are consistent with the industries in 
the previous section of this paper. The process is rather straightforward, and the exact 
components of the reconstructed industries are detailed in Appendix B. One important 
assumption is that the sub-industry of (textile) bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing 
trades is allocated pro rata among the four classes of textiles.
33
        
Capital intensity is proxied by horsepower per £1 million of gross output. Labour 
intensity is proxied by employees per £1 million of gross output. Both of these proxies  
                                                          
32
 Laursen, ‘International specialization’, p. 105. 
33
 In 1906, the output of this sub-industry was £17.9 million, or about 6% of the entire textile 
industry. Census of production. 
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Table 3. Factor intensities of British industries, 1906 
Industry 
Capital intensity 
(horsepower per 
£1mn output) 
Labour intensity 
(employees per 
£1mn output) 
Material intensity 
(share of material 
inputs in output) 
Beer 961 1,263 0.38 
Cement 16,085 3,968 0.48 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
3,845 2,028 0.62 
Clocks and watches 897 8,648 0.38 
Copper manufactures 2,537 1,241 0.83 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 7,407 3,397 0.72 
Earthenware and chinaware 10,360 8,659 0.36 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
5,300 4,846 0.68 
Glass 4,293 6,489 0.38 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
8,688 3,863 0.63 
Leather and manufactures thereof 992 3,994 0.68 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
3,218 4,485 0.47 
Paper and manufactures thereof 11,080 3,957 0.64 
Rubber manufactures 3,080 2,699 0.67 
Silk manufactures 3,760 6,376 0.62 
Spirits 1,768 865 0.79 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
4,472 3,607 0.71 
Mean 5,220 4,140 0.59 
Coefficient of variation 0.81 0.56 0.26 
Source: Census of production (1907). 
 
resemble the ones employed by Crafts and Thomas (1986) when they estimated the factor 
determinants of British exports for 1880, although their source of data was the cruder Factory 
inspectorate returns, as compiled by Musson (1976).
34
 Because the Census of production 
                                                          
34
 See Musson, ‘Motive power’, pp. 437-9. 
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reported the value of material inputs, material intensity is measured directly as the share of 
material inputs in gross output. Factor intensities per industry are reported in Table 3. It 
should be observed that the coefficient of variation differs considerably depending upon the 
factor intensity, with capital intensity per industry being the most disperse of the factors. 
Imposing Edwardian factor proportions on late-Victorian manufacturing industries is, 
recognizably, far from ideal. This approach is mostly necessitated by the availability of 
systematically collected data across a range of industries. Britain was a relative latecomer 
among industrial countries in collecting data on manufacturing output, and the Census of 
production was the first such exercise.
35
 The error of backdating the factor portions is 
perhaps not so grave in the context of ‘mature’ industrial Britain. Matthews et al. (1982) have 
pointed to the similar growth rates of capital and output in the British manufacturing sector 
during the 1880s and 1890s, suggesting more or less constant capital intensity, though labour 
intensity likely declined during these decades.
36
 Of course, the factor proportions of 
individual industries may have changed to a much greater extent than suggested by the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Nevertheless, without dismissing the possibility of such 
changes, the foregoing analysis relies on the data from the Census of production, which 
represents the best available source for the given purpose. 
Table 4 presents the results of a semi-log OLS regression that estimates the 
determinants of Britain’s comparative advantages. The dependent variable, the RSCA 
indicator, is expressed in levels. All of the continuous explanatory variables are expressed in 
natural logarithms. Columns 1-4 pool the data for all three benchmark years. Column 1 
clearly indicates that Britain’s comparative advantages were in the relatively capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries and, inconsistent with Crafts and Thomas, in the relatively labour 
non-intensive manufacturing industries. The coefficients imply that a doubling of the capital 
intensity in an industry would increase its RSCA indicator by 0.20 and that a doubling of the 
labour intensity of an industry would decrease its RSCA indicator by 0.28. Based upon these 
coefficients, Britain would have realized a comparative advantage in the glass industry in 
1880, for example, if its capital intensity was at least 40 per cent higher or if its labour 
intensity was at least 29 per cent lower. 
That the coefficient of material intensity is not statistically significant may seem 
surprising, given Britain’s limited natural resource endowments. There are three potential 
explanations for this finding. First, Victorian Britain espoused a policy of free trade, which  
                                                          
35
 By comparison, the United States was collecting such data nearly a century before Britain. 
36
 Matthews et al., British economic growth, pp. 377-82. 
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Table 4. Three-factor H-O model of RSCA indicators, 1880-1900 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Capital intensity 
(1906)  
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.17* 
(0.08) 
Labour intensity 
(1906)  
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
-0.35*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.25*** 
(0.06) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.28** 
(0.11) 
-0.31** 
(0.11) 
Material intensity 
(1906) 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
     
Textile  
0.20* 
(0.11) 
     
Capital/labour 
(1870) 
  
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
    
Constant 
0.80 
(0.57) 
1.22** 
(0.60) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.71 
(0.55) 
0.01 
(1.13) 
0.84 
(0.92) 
1.29 
(0.96) 
R
2 
0.33 0.38 0.44 0.33 0.24 0.41 0.40 
Observations 51 51 48 51 17 17 17 
Years All years All years All years All years 1880 1890 1900 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are noted in parentheses. All variables, except for the dependent variable and 
the textile dummy, are expressed in natural logarithms. Col. 3 omits the cement industry, as it did 
not appear in the Factory inspectorate returns. 
 
extended to raw materials and intermediate inputs. Unlike in other industrial countries, where 
a protectionist backlash had taken hold, the British manufacturing sector could obtain 
material inputs at close to the world price. The relatively material-intensive industry of 
woollen and worsted manufactures illustrates this point well. By the late nineteenth century, 
the majority of the raw wool used in the British woollen and worsted industry was imported, 
and this imported share reached as high as four-fifths by 1895-9.
37
 The American woollen 
and worsted industry also relied heavily on imported wool. However, whereas Britain 
imported wool free of duty, the United States imposed a considerable duty on this imported 
material input. Following the passage of the McKinley Tariff of 1890, the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff on wool exceeded 40 per cent.
38
 The divergent trade policies of Britain and 
the United States may account, at least in part, for why the RCA indicator of the British 
woollen and worsted industry steadily increased throughout the late nineteenth century, 
whilst the American woollen and worsted industry remained at a nearly perfect comparative 
disadvantage. 
 In addition to wool, Britain imported a range of material inputs for its manufacturing 
sector, and many of these material inputs were sourced from the British Empire, which 
                                                          
37
 Deane and Cole, British economic growth, p. 196. 
38
 Foreign commerce (1891/2). 
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represents another potential explanation for the material neutrality of Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages. The recent gravity literature yields unambiguous evidence for an 
empire-effect on commodity trade. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) estimated that 
membership in the British Empire alone more than doubled intra-Empire bilateral trade 
flows.
39
 Following a different empirical strategy, Jacks et al. (2010) estimated that 
membership in the British Empire reduced intra-Empire bilateral trade costs by half.
40
  
Indeed, recourse to a resource-rich empire mitigated the effects of Britain’s relatively 
unfavourable natural resource endowments on its manufacturing sector. 
 A third potential explanation lies in what lay beneath Britain: coal. Insofar as coal was 
a material input in the manufacturing sector, Britain’s natural resource endowments were 
exceptionally favourable. Surely, the factor proportion of this material input varied greatly 
across industries. In the British iron and steel industry, it can be estimated that the factor 
proportion of this material input was on the order of 11 per cent in 1887.
41
 While the factor 
proportion of coal would have been lower in most other industries, it was hardly negligible.
42
            
Returning now to Table 4, column 2 includes a dummy variable for the four textile 
classes, in order to test whether factor endowments adequately explain Britain’s notoriously 
persistent comparative advantages in these industries of the (first) Industrial Revolution, the 
silk industry notwithstanding. The coefficient of this dummy variable is expectedly positive, 
and it is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, suggesting some element of hysteresis 
in the textile industries. 
 As already mentioned, the regression imposes Edwardian factor proportions on late-
Victorian comparative advantages. Given this inter-temporal mismatch, it would be advisable 
to perform a robustness check using the earlier, more rudimentary data from Factory 
inspectorate returns. As was done for the Census of production, industries are ‘reconstructed’ 
to match the RSCA indicators, and the components are listed in Appendix B. The Factory 
inspectorate returns reported the amounts of horsepower and employees in each industry and 
sub-industry, but not the value of output. Thus, it is necessary to standardize capital and 
                                                          
39
 Mitchener and Weidenmier, ‘Trade and empire’, pp. 1813-4.  
40
 Jacks et al., ‘Trade costs’, p. 135. 
41
 The British iron and steel industry consumed an estimated 27 million tonnes of coal in 1887 
(Mitchell, British coal industry, p. 12). In that year, the export price of coal was £0.41 per tonne, as 
calculated from Annual statement (1887). The estimated average annual gross output at current value 
of the British iron and steel industry was £103 million during the interval from 1885-9 (Deane and 
Cole, British economic growth, p. 225). Accordingly, the factor proportion of coal in the British iron 
and steel industry is estimated at 11%.   
42
 In 1887, the British iron and steel industry accounted for substantially less than half of the 
coal consumed in the manufacturing sector. Mitchell, British coal industry, p. 12. 
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labour relative to each other. Column 3 regresses the RSCA indicators against the log of the 
1870 capital-labour ratio. The coefficient is statistically significant and positive, as expected. 
However, the relative contributions of capital intensity and labour intensity cannot be 
discerned from this single variable. 
 Did the factor determinants of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages 
change throughout the 1880s and 1890s? Does pooling the data for all three benchmark years 
obscure an instability in the magnitudes (or possibly signs) of the factor coefficients? These 
questions are answered by estimating separate regressions for each of the three benchmark 
years. Due to the small number of industries (17) observed in any single year, the explanatory 
variables are limited to just capital and labour intensity. Column 4 regresses the RSCA 
indicators against the logs of these variables using the pooled data. Columns 5-7 estimate the 
same regression for each of the three benchmark years. While the signs of the coefficients do 
not change, it is noteworthy that the coefficient of labour intensity increases from 1880-90 
and again from 1890-1900. Moreover, this coefficient is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level in the regression for 1880. 
 The increasing coefficient of labour intensity reflects an increasing relative scarcity of 
labour in Britain. This relative labour scarcity has often been viewed in an American mirror. 
With respect to the late nineteenth century, Habakkuk (1962) stated, ‘And if American labour 
was, except in the remoter parts of the country, no longer scarce, in England it was no longer 
as abundant as it had been earlier in the century’.43 By the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century, the archetypes of labour-utilizing British manufacturing and labour-economizing 
American manufacturing had become compromised by an Anglo-American real wage 
convergence. Between 1870 and 1895, the British unskilled wage had increased from 60 to 
69 per cent of the American unskilled wage.
44
 O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) argued that 
this Anglo-American real wage convergence was primarily due to a convergence in 
commodity prices.
45
 Indeed, not only was the sector composition of the British economy 
affected by commodity-price convergence, so too was the sub-sector composition of British 
manufacturing. 
It is likely the manufacturing comparative advantages of mid-Victorian Britain would 
have tended less toward the relatively labour non-intensive manufacturing industries. But by 
1890, a labour-economizing regime in British manufacturing had clearly emerged. To fully 
                                                          
43
 Habakkuk, American and British technology, pp. 194-5. 
44
 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘Factor-price convergence’, p. 895. 
45
 Ibid., p. 909. 
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appreciate the relative labour non-intensity of late-Victorian Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages, it is necessary to consider the factor endowments of Continental 
Europe, which supplied more than half of world manufactured exports in 1899.
46
 On the 
Continent, labour was relatively more abundant than in Britain. Moreover, as Williamson 
(1995) pointed out, the Anglo-French and Anglo-German real wage differentials had actually 
widened (slightly) in the late nineteenth century.
47
 On the whole, the relative labour 
endowment of Britain was moving closer to that of the United States and farther from those 
of industrial Europe. It would not be disingenuous to argue that, in the late nineteenth 
century, the starker contrast is between the factor determinants of manufacturing in the 
Anglosphere and on the Continent, rather than between the factor determinants of 
manufacturing in Britain and the United States.    
Four-factor model 
Harley (1974) argued that, for Edwardian Britain, labour as a single factor cannot sufficiently 
explain the pattern of comparative advantages. Rather, skilled labour ought to be 
differentiated from unskilled labour because Edwardian Britain was relatively abundant in the 
former and relatively scarce in the latter.
48
 In this vein, the present study considers whether 
human capital was a determinant of Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages using a 
four-factor H-O model of trade. 
 Human capital intensity per industry is proxied by the industry wage standardized for 
the wage of unskilled labour. The source for data on industry wages is the Returns of wages 
of 1887. This publication presents the weekly wage data that the British Board of Trade 
solicited from local chambers of commerce on an intermittent basis since 1830, the three 
most recent wage ‘censuses’ having occurred in the years 1877, 1880, and 1883. This paper 
makes use of just the wage data from 1883. The wage observations are disaggregated by 
occupation, locality, and industry. For example, a ‘mill man’ in the Macclesfield silk 
manufacturing industry earned a (quite low) wage of 18s. per week. Occasionally, the 
Returns of wages reports a range, rather than a single amount, for an occupation-locality-
                                                          
46
 Calculated from Tyszynski, ‘Manufactured commodities’, p. 277. 
47
 Williamson, ‘Global labor markets’, p. 155. Between 1870 and 1900, the French unskilled 
real wage declined from 72 to 68% of the British, while the German declined from 84 to 83% of the 
British. 
48
 As Harley noted, the distinction between skilled and unskilled labour offered a potential 
resolution to the famous Leontief paradox in post-war American trade. He speculated that there may 
have been a Leontief paradox in Edwardian British trade, whereby labour-scarce Britain exported 
labour-intensive manufactured commodities. While he did not quite advance such an assertion, he did 
claim that the two-factor (capital and labour) H-O model was inadequate. Harley, ‘Edwardian 
industry’, pp. 411-3.           
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industry wage observation. In these instances, the midpoint is used. Additionally, only the 
wages of adult men are used in calculating the proxy. In total, there are 737 occupation-
locality-industry wage observations across 13 industries. Some industries enjoy more 
observations than do others, and the numbers of wage observations per industry are reported 
in Appendix C. There are no observations for the industries of cement; clocks and watches; 
copper manufactures; and rubber manufactures; and so these industries are unavoidably 
excluded from the four-factor H-O model.       
 Within each industry, which specific wage observation best captures the human 
capital attainment of its labour force? Here, it is worth mentioning that almost all industries 
had high-paid foremen and low-paid warehousemen and general labourers. The variation in 
human capital attainment is unlikely to manifest itself at the upper and lower endpoints of the 
wage scale in each industry. Instead, the ideal proxy for human capital falls somewhere 
between these endpoints. Without any pre-existing knowledge of where along the wage scale 
human capital attainment is best captured, this paper constructs three separate proxies for 
human capital intensity for each industry, corresponding to the first, second, and third quartile 
wage observations. These three wage observations per industry are then each standardized by 
the unskilled wage, taken to be the lowest of the 737 wage observations. The lowest 
observation is 13s. per week, the wage of a general labourer in the Belfast linen textile 
industry. All three proxies are presented in Appendix C.  
 Table 5 provides the results of the four-factor H-O model. The first column of Table 5 
simply reproduces the first column of Table 4, but for the reduced sample of 13 industries. 
The loss of four industries does not alter the signs of the coefficients, but does reduce their 
statistical significance from the 1 to 5 per cent level. Columns 2-4 introduce the proxies for 
human capital intensity. Only the coefficient of the third-quartile proxy for human capital 
intensity is statistically significant, and at the 5 per cent level. This finding suggests that 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages were in those industries that required a high 
degree of human capital attainment to be possessed by a small share of employees. To be 
sure, such an interpretation begs for qualitative substantiation, which would far exceed the 
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, this finding does call into doubt the assertion by Crafts and 
Thomas that Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages were in the relatively human 
capital non-intensive manufacturing industries. 
 What is perhaps more remarkable is how, even after controlling for human capital, 
Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages remain labour non-intensive. The claim by 
Crafts and Thomas that Britain’s manufacturing comparative advantages were labour  
Varian 19 
 
Table 5. Four-factor H-O model of RSCA indicators, 1880-1900 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capital intensity 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
Labour intensity 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.24** 
(0.10) 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
Material intensity 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
Human capital intensity 
(first quartile) 
 
-0.71 
(0.70) 
  
Human capital intensity 
(second quartile) 
  
0.42 
(0.46) 
 
Human capital intensity 
(third quartile) 
   
0.83** 
(0.41) 
Constant 
0.43 
(0.66) 
0.82 
(0.75) 
0.27 
(0.68) 
0.14 
(0.64) 
R
2 
0.16 0.18 0.18 0.25 
Observations 39 39 39 39 
Sources: See text. 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are noted in parentheses. All variables, except for the dependent variable, are 
expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
intensive finds absolutely no confirmation here. In using a dependent variable normalized for 
the composition of world exports, this study finds the opposite.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has calculated RCA and RSCA indicators for the manufacturing industries of late-
Victorian Britain (and other industrial countries). To be sure, these indicators will prove 
useful to historians of individual industries, particularly since they correspond to the period 
when the pace of foreign industrialization accelerated. Here, however, the indicators were 
used for a more concerted purpose, which was to identify the factor determinants of Britain’s 
manufacturing comparative advantages. The finding that Britain’s manufacturing 
comparative advantages were in the relatively (unskilled) labour non-intensive industries 
departed from the earlier conclusion of Crafts and Thomas (1986). This finding was unaltered 
by the inclusion of human capital as a fourth factor determinant, although it remains 
ambiguous whether human capital itself determined the industries in which Britain had a 
comparative advantage. The discrepancy between this study and Crafts and Thomas may be 
attributed to the superiority of the data employed here. 
 With respect to relative labour scarcity, Britain was somewhere between the United 
States and Continental Europe. The labour non-intensity of late-Victorian Britain’s 
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manufacturing comparative advantages reflects a position closer to the United States than to 
the Continent. To be sure, differences between British and American manufacturing did exist 
on both the inter-industry and intra-industry levels, and these differences have been the 
subject of a well-developed scholarly literature. Given the findings of this paper, future 
scholars might instead prefer to emphasize some of the similarities between British and 
American manufacturing, rather than the differences.     
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Appendix A 
Belgium, RCA indicators, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(15) 
0.1 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
Cement 
2.6 
(5) 
1.3 
(8) 
5.8 
(2) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
0.9 
(7) 
2.0 
(4) 
2.3 
(5) 
Clocks and watches 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
Copper manufactures 
0.3 
(13) 
0.4 
(11) 
0.3 
(13) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.3 
(12) 
0.3 
(12) 
0.3 
(11) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
0.8 
(8) 
1.8 
(5) 
1.5 
(8) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
4.4 
(2) 
4.9 
(2) 
5.1 
(3) 
Glass 
8.7 
(1) 
7.0 
(1) 
8.3 
(1) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.7 
(9) 
1.7 
(6) 
1.5 
(7) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.5 
(11) 
0.6 
(10) 
1.2 
(9) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
2.6 
(4) 
3.3 
(3) 
2.3 
(4) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
3.1 
(3) 
1.6 
(7) 
1.7 
(6) 
Rubber manufactures 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
0.2 
(14) 
Silk manufactures 
0.0 
(16) 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
Spirits 
0.5 
(10) 
0.1 
(13) 
0.3 
(12) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.8 
(6) 
1.3 
(9) 
0.8 
(10) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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France, RCA indicators, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(17) 
0.3 
(17) 
0.5 
(16) 
Cement 
0.4 
(14) 
2.0 
(8) 
1.9 
(7) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
1.2 
(9) 
1.2 
(10) 
1.4 
(10) 
Clocks and watches 
3.6 
(3) 
3.6 
(3) 
4.8 
(2) 
Copper manufactures 
0.3 
(15) 
0.6 
(14) 
0.7 
(13) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.3 
(16) 
0.4 
(16) 
0.7 
(14) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
1.4 
(8) 
1.9 
(9) 
1.8 
(9) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.8 
(11) 
0.5 
(15) 
1.0 
(12) 
Glass 
1.6 
(7) 
2.1 
(7) 
2.1 
(6) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.5 
(13) 
0.8 
(11) 
0.6 
(15) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
4.1 
(2) 
3.6 
(4) 
3.0 
(4) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
0.5 
(12) 
0.7 
(13) 
0.5 
(17) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
2.7 
(5) 
2.3 
(6) 
1.9 
(8) 
Rubber manufactures 
1.2 
(10) 
0.8 
(12) 
1.0 
(11) 
Silk manufactures 
3.6 
(4) 
4.3 
(2) 
5.6 
(1) 
Spirits 
4.5 
(1) 
4.8 
(1) 
3.7 
(3) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
2.5 
(6) 
2.4 
(5) 
2.2 
(5) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Germany, RCA indicators, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
2.7 
(6) 
2.2 
(8) 
2.2 
(7) 
Cement 
3.1 
(4) 
2.8 
(5) 
2.8 
(4) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
4.4 
(1) 
4.5 
(2) 
3.8 
(2) 
Clocks and watches 
2.2 
(8) 
2.7 
(6) 
2.1 
(9) 
Copper manufactures 
1.3 
(14) 
1.4 
(13) 
1.2 
(14) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.7 
(16) 
0.9 
(16) 
1.0 
(15) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
2.5 
(7) 
1.9 
(11) 
2.8 
(5) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.5 
(17) 
0.5 
(17) 
0.5 
(17) 
Glass 
1.9 
(11) 
2.2 
(9) 
1.6 
(12) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
2.0 
(10) 
1.9 
(12) 
2.0 
(10) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
2.0 
(9) 
2.6 
(7) 
1.9 
(11) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
1.2 
(15) 
0.9 
(15) 
1.5 
(13) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
3.2 
(3) 
4.7 
(1) 
4.0 
(1) 
Rubber manufactures 
2.9 
(5) 
3.2 
(4) 
2.9 
(3) 
Silk manufactures 
3.7 
(2) 
3.6 
(3) 
2.5 
(6) 
Spirits 
1.9 
(12) 
1.2 
(14) 
0.9 
(16) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
1.8 
(13) 
2.1 
(10) 
2.1 
(8) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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United States, RCA indicators, 1880-1900 
Industry 1880 1890 1900 
Beer 
0.1 
(12) 
0.4 
(9) 
0.9 
(7) 
Cement 
0.1 
(14) 
0.1 
(15) 
0.1 
(15) 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
0.2 
(7) 
0.4 
(8) 
0.6 
(10) 
Clocks and watches 
1.2 
(1) 
1.6 
(1) 
1.4 
(5) 
Copper manufactures 
0.2 
(9) 
0.5 
(6) 
3.6 
(1) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 
0.2 
(11) 
0.2 
(13) 
0.4 
(12) 
Earthenware and chinaware 
0.0 
(15) 
0.1 
(14) 
0.2 
(14) 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
0.1 
(13) 
0.2 
(12) 
0.4 
(11) 
Glass 
0.2 
(10) 
0.2 
(11) 
0.4 
(13) 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
0.3 
(5) 
0.4 
(7) 
1.4 
(4) 
Leather and manufactures thereof 
0.5 
(4) 
0.8 
(2) 
1.6 
(3) 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
0.5 
(3) 
0.8 
(3) 
1.6 
(2) 
Paper and manufactures thereof 
0.2 
(6) 
0.2 
(10) 
0.7 
(8) 
Rubber manufactures 
0.2 
(8) 
0.6 
(4) 
1.1 
(6) 
Silk manufactures 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
0.0 
(17) 
Spirits 
0.7 
(2) 
0.5 
(5) 
0.6 
(9) 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
0.0 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
0.0 
(16) 
Sources: See text. 
Note: Rankings of indicators are noted in parentheses. 
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Appendix B  
 
Industry components, Census of production 
Beer: Brewing and malting trades 
Cement: Cement trade 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Chemicals, coal tar products, drugs, and 
perfumery trade; Paint, colour, and varnish trades 
Clocks and watches: Watch and clock trades 
Copper manufactures: Copper and brass trades (smelting, rolling, and casting) 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton trade; 61% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing 
trades 
Earthenware and chinaware: Bricks and fireclay trades; China and earthenware trades 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Jute, hemp, and linen trades; 11% of 
Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades; Rope, twine, and net trades 
Glass: Glass, stone, roofing, felts, and miscellaneous trades 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Iron and steel, engineering, and 
shipbuilding trades (all sub-industries thereof); excluding Engineering trades (including 
electrical engineering); excluding Shipbuilding and marine engineering trades; excluding Small 
arms trades 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Boot and shoe trades; Glove trade; Leather trade (tanning and 
dressing); Saddlery and harness trade; Traveling bag and fancy leather goods trade 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Engineering trades (including electrical 
engineering) 
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper trade; Cardboard box trade 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: Indiarubber trades 
Silk manufactures: Silk trades; 2% of Bleaching, dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
Spirits: Spirit distilling trade; Spirit compounding, rectifying, and methylating trades 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn: Woollen and worsted trades; 26% of Bleaching, 
dyeing, printing, and finishing trades 
 
Industry components, Factory inspectorate returns 
Beer: Breweries  
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, medicine, and paint: Miscellaneous chemical works 
Clocks and watches: Clocks and watches 
Copper manufactures: Copper-mills 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn: Cotton factories  
Earthenware and chinaware: Potteries; Other earthenware; Bricks and tiles 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, including yarn and cordage: Flax factories; Hemp factories; Jute 
factories; Ropemaking 
Glass: Glass-making  
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, excluding machinery: Blast furnaces and iron-mills; Foundries; 
Nails and rivets; Cutlery; Files, saws, and tools; Locks 
Leather and manufactures thereof: Leather manufactures (all sub-industries thereof); Boot- and shoe-
making; Manufacture of gloves 
Machinery, including steam engines and locomotives: Manufacture of machinery  
Paper and manufactures thereof: Paper manufactures (all sub-industries thereof) 
Rubber and manufactures thereof: India-rubber and gutta percha  
Silk manufactures: Silk factories 
Spirits: Distilleries  
Woollen and worsted manufactures, including yarn: Woollen factories; Worsted factories  
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Appendix C 
Human capital proxies, 1883 
Industry N First quartile Second quartile Third quartile 
Beer 6 1.69 1.74 1.92 
Chemicals, including dyestuffs, 
medicine, and paint 
19 1.46 1.97 2.38 
Cotton manufactures, including yarn 85 1.62 1.92 2.77 
Earthenware and chinaware 10 1.63 1.85 2.17 
Flax, hemp, and jute manufactures, 
including yarn and cordage 
46 1.46 1.82 2.11 
Glass 29 1.92 2.28 2.54 
Iron, steel, and manufactures thereof, 
excluding machinery 
164 1.77 2.31 2.62 
Leather and manufactures thereof 56 1.83 2.15 2.35 
Machinery, including steam engines 
and locomotives 
112 1.72 2.34 2.60 
Paper and manufactures thereof 32 1.60 1.83 2.32 
Silk manufactures 11 1.58 1.69 1.82 
Spirits 4 1.66 1.82 2.06 
Woollen and worsted manufactures, 
including yarn 
164 1.49 1.78 2.31 
Source: Wage returns (1887). 
Notes: See text.   
 
